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BACKGROUND: Policy makers across the political
spectrum, as well as many clinicians and physician
professional associations, have proposed that better
information on comparative clinical effectiveness
should be a key element of any solution to the US
health-care cost crisis. This superficial consensus hides
intense disagreements over critical issues essential to
any new public effort to promote more comparative
effectiveness research (CER).
METHODS AND RESULTS: This article reviews the
background for these disputes, summarizes the differ-
ent perspectives represented by policy makers and
advocates, and offers a framework to aid both practicing
and academic internists in understanding the key
elements of the emerging debate. Regarding the funda-
mental question of “what is CER,” disagreements rage
over whether value or cost effectiveness should be a
consideration, and how specific patient perspectives
should be reflected in the development and the use of
such research. The question of how to pay for CER
invokes controversies over the role of the market in
producing such information and the private (e.g.,
insurers and employers) versus public responsibility
for its production. The financing debate further high-
lights the high stakes of comparative effectiveness
research, and the risks of stakeholder interests sub-
verting any public process. Accordingly there are a
range of proposals for the federal government’s role in
prioritization, development, and dissemination of CER.
CONCLUSION: The internal medicine community, with
its long history of commitment to scientific medical
practice and its leadership in evidence–based medicine,
should have a strong interest and play an active role in
this debate.
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effectiveness analysis (CEA); policy debate; health care costs.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the seriousness of the nation’s current economic woes,
prominent health policy makers and Obama administration
officials see rising health-care costs as the key long-term fiscal
challenge to the US.1,2 Furthermore, many health service
researchers and policy analysts assert that if medical practice
were more evidence-based, substantial savings could be
achieved without loss of access or quality of care.3,4 Accord-
ingly, better information on comparative clinical effectiveness
is seen to be a critical element of the solution to the national
health-care cost crisis,5–7 and the recently enacted American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 committed $1.1 billion
over 2 years to expand these efforts.8 Since the marketplace
does not produce sufficient quantities of high-quality clinical
effectiveness research,6,9 a broad range of stake holders agree
on the need for public intervention to provide more and better
information on comparative clinical effectiveness.3,4,6,7,10–12,13
Underneath this broad consensus, however, debate rages on
what kind of CER should be promoted, who should fund it,
and how it should be conducted. The resolution of this debate
has significant implications for both the quality and quantity
of future evidence guiding clinical practice. This article will
summarize key elements of the current debate, focusing on the
policy issues of greatest importance to internists seeking better
evidence to inform decisions at the bedside.
WHAT IS COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH?
Policy makers have defined comparative effectiveness research
(CER) as “a rigorous evaluation of the impact of different
options that are available for treating a given medical condition
for a particular set of patients. Such a study may compare
similar treatments, such as competing drugs, or it may analyze
very different approaches, such as surgery and drug therapy.
The analysis may focus only on the relative medical benefits
and risks of each option, or it may also weigh both the costs
and the benefits of those options.”9 The focus of CER is
effectiveness under average conditions in diverse populations
and clinical practice settings, in contrast to traditional clinical
trials investigating intervention efficacy under ideal conditions.
Comparative effectiveness research will necessarily employ
a broad range of research methodologies. These include not
only randomized, controlled clinical trials, but also systematic
reviews of existing research, practical clinical trials, medical
registries, “coverage with evidence development” projects by
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payers, and observational studies using large data sets (such
as electronic health records from HMO networks).7,9,14–16
These raise a variety of methodological challenges as well as
controversies regarding the standard of evidence needed to
promote, or restrict, use of a clinical service.14,16–20,20–24
Beyond these substantive methodological issues, there is
considerable policy debate regarding other aspects of the
potential scope for comparative effectiveness research. Most
advocates insist that CER should have an emphasis on
developing information useful from the health-care consumer’s
point of view (as opposed to the perspective of the payer or the
investigator).25–27 Thus, CER should be informative about the
outcomes that patients most care about, such as ability to
function and the quality (not just length) of life. Advocates are
also concerned that CER provides more information than
simply the perspective of the “average” patient; accordingly,
many consumer advocacy groups urge that CER explicitly
address the specific needs of various sub-populations (e.g.,
women, children, ethnic minorities).25–28
Perhaps no issue in the CER debate is more controversial
than the role of assessment of the comparative “value” or cost of
clinical services. This subject was explored in depth in a recent
series of Annals articles,29–31 and anxieties of manufacturers
and some patient advocacy groups have been highlighted in the
recent editorializing over the comparative effectiveness research
provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009.32–35 In brief, opponents of CER view the inclusion of cost
or value within the context of comparative effectiveness
research as equivalent to payer-oriented cost-effectiveness
analysis (CEA). Such CEA is assumed a precursor to nation-
wide coverage determinations and rationing of access to
expensive but effective therapies. Advocates for patients with
rare conditions, and for disease groups with particularly
expensive treatments, are of course particularly alert to these
concerns, as are the developers of expensive innovations.36
This fear of centralized national coverage determinations has
even complicated discussion of the nature of reports to be
developed by publically supported CER. Some advocates would
prefer that any publically funded CER effort should provide only
summaries of studies, rather than publish recommendations
(such as the United States Preventive Services Task Force does)
or clinical practice guidelines.11,25,28,37
WHO SHOULD PAY FOR CER?
Clinical research is time-consuming and costly, thereby con-
tributing to its underproduction by existing private interests.6,9
Manufacturers are not required by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration to demonstrate comparative effectiveness of new drugs
or devices, and physicians routinely introduce new practices
and procedures without strong evidence of relative clinical
effectiveness. Since robust CER studies could result in a loss in
market share,manufacturers and providers are notmotivated to
invest in the full range of clinical effectiveness information of
greatest benefit to patients and health professionals. Further-
more, health-care purchasers like health plans and large
employers cannot justify substantial corporate investments in
CER. To adequately inform the practice community, the findings
of CER must be disseminated in an open and transparent
fashion. Therefore, individual health-care purchasers cannot
gain a unique financial advantage from investments in CER.6,9
Similarly, it is difficult to envision a “Consumers Report” type of
business model using patient subscriptions or per-use charges
to finance CER.
Public financing of CER has its own difficulties. With over
16% of gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to health care, the
research on comparative clinical effectiveness involves “high
stakes,” resulting in “winners”—providers or manufacturers
whose health care services are found to be superior—as well as
“losers” whose services are of lesser value, or even harmful. In a
future where health-care decisions are strongly guided by
comparative effectiveness research, studies will have enormous
financial and other consequences for important health-care
stakeholders. Consider the implications of a negative study on a
manufacturers’ key source of revenue (e.g., erythrocyte-stimu-
lating agents for Amgen) or on a clinical dominant service line
(e.g., angioplasty for interventional cardiologists; hip and knee
surgery rehabilitation for inpatient rehabilitation facilities).
Not surprisingly, the typical annual Congressional appro-
priations dedicated to CER have been miniscule; support for
the only explicit federal CER program, the “Effective Health
Care Program” of the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ), was only $30million for 2008 compared to over
$29 billion for the National Institutes of Health (NIH).9,11,16,25
Despite the one-time infusion of CER funds to the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), AHRQ, and the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) under the 2009 Recovery Act, policy
makers are skeptical regarding the feasibility of the annual
Congressional appropriation ever being a viable source for
substantial, sustained investments in CER.38 The appropria-
tions process, a yearly political exercise weighing the allocation
of government funds to activities as diverse as space explora-
tion, cancer cures, road construction, veterans care, and Head
Start, is fraught with risks for political intrusion into the
selection, production, or dissemination of CER.
The political backlash directed through the appropriations
process at the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR) is a case study of these risks. Established in 1989,
AHCPR had statutory responsibilities for such CER-type
activities as outcomes research and practice guideline develop-
ment. It received substantially increased funding over its
predecessor, the National Center for Health Services Research,
to initiate major initiatives like Patient Outcomes Research
Teams. These multidisciplinary centers focused on particular
medical problems, reviewed and synthesized available re-
search, analyzed practice variations and patient outcomes,
and evaluated the effects of disseminating their findings. By
1995, PORT back pain research and related back pain
management guidelines had questioned the value of back
surgery in many clinical circumstances as well as the growing
use of new surgical appliances like the pedicle screw. The
hostility of back surgeons and device manufacturers to this
work led to calls to eliminate the Agency as an unwarranted
intrusion into the physician-patient relationship. Signaling
this displeasure, in June of 1995 the House/Senate budget
committee conference report called for elimination of AHCPR.
Subsequent negotiations in the latter stages of the appropria-
tions process prevented complete de-funding of AHCPR.
Nonetheless, as a result of this controversy, the Agency suffered
a severe budget reduction, with attendant loss of programs in
outcomes research and clinical guidelines development, and, in
1999, a name change (to AHRQ).39,40
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This example is the best known of a variety of failed efforts in
the US to undertake publically supported comparative assess-
ments of health-care services. Informed by these experiences,
CER policy makers have sought to secure the advantages of
public financing for CER without the complications of annual
Congressional appropriations. This requires the establishment
of a dedicated trust fund, or some other mechanism of
mandatory recurring funding, such as a tax on private health
insurance, a new payroll tax, or a mandatory tap on the general
federal revenue. While these approaches remove the public
financing of comparative effectiveness research from the
annual appropriations process, they introduce new challenges
regarding how these funds should be managed.6,7,9,41
HOW SHOULD CER INVESTMENTS BE MANAGED?
Because of the high stakes nature of CER, as well as recent
examples of “pressure” placed on Congress and/or Federal
agencies regarding the interpretation and use of clinical
evidence,39,40,42,43 policy makers have proposed a variety of
governance options, weighing the risks of political intrusion
into the selection, creation, and dissemination of comparative
effectiveness information. The CER process will have a variety
of steps, each of which will be of great interest to one or more
stakeholders. These include the selection of priority topics for
research (which drugs, procedures, and/or devices should be
scrutinized first), the framing of study questions (e.g., study
drug effects on blood pressure control or on quality-adjusted
life-years), the choice of research method (e.g., commission a
systematic review or a practical clinical trial), the phrasing of
study conclusions (e.g., “trend toward benefit for glucose
control” vs “unlikely to have any meaningful impact on patient
quality of life”), and the dissemination of findings.6,7,9,16
Special interests will be tempted to exert influence on all these
processes, and various executive branch officials could provide
a point of contact to steer the results in the direction preferred
by a key stake holder. And of course Congress can express
pleasure or displeasure with study findings through various
investigative or legislative actions.
In considering options for governing the conduct of com-
parative effectiveness research, policy makers have identified a
number of important principles, exemplified in the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) report Knowing What Works in Health Care.11
These include accountability, consistency, efficiency, feasibility,
objectivity, responsiveness, scientific rigor, and transparency.
While each of these principles is relevant to CER, they often
represent competing, albeit important, priorities. For example,
responsiveness might compete with transparency or efficiency
(as defined by avoiding unnecessary duplication of resources),
and scientific rigor almost always competes with feasibility and
ability to respond quickly. A more complex challenge addressed
in the IOM report is that of coordination of efforts in order to
ensure the authoritativeness of comparative effectiveness re-
search studies. In the US, competing or conflicting clinical
research findings may give providers broad discretion to make
“preference-sensitive” or “supply-sensitive” medical deci-
sions.44,45 Accordingly these conflicting lines of clinical evi-
dence may contribute substantially to wasteful variations in
health-care expenditures and to inflationary increases in
health-care spending. In light of these issues, policy experts
have proposed several organizational options to manage this
high-stakes scientific work.6,9,16,41,46
One proposed approach to governing publically funded CER
is a Federally-funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC).46 FFRDCs are hybrid organizations47 that came to
prominence at the close of World War II through national
defense and nuclear energy laboratories (e.g., Oak Ridge, Los
Alamos). They provide executive branch departments with the
option of establishing a government funded entity that is
operated by a non-federal organization unfettered by civil
service rules or other federal management laws. The theo-
retical advantages of an FFRDC for CER include close
government oversight combined with some freedom from
regulation. Transparency and accountability may suffer, how-
ever, since FFRDCs are not subject to laws governing the
establishment and management of advisory committees nor to
federal employee regulations. Furthermore, it is unclear how
an FFRDC could achieve the IOM’s goal of coordinated
activities across agencies, having neither authority over exec-
utive branch employees nor the ability to readily transfer funds
to other government agencies with relevant CER capabilities
[e.g., AHRQ, NIH, Veterans Administration (VA), Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)]. Furthermore, since the
FFRDC contract must be periodically renewed, executive
branch officials will have ample opportunity to express dis-
pleasure and exert influence over CER processes. Congress
can also use its oversight authority to challenge findings as well
as exert annual appropriations pressure on the federal agency
parent of the FFRDC. Thus, the integrity and clinical utility of
the findings of an FFRDC for CER could be highly dependent on
the agency, the FFRDC contractor, and the advisory board
established to manage it. In the 110th Congress, proposals in
both the House48 and the Senate49 have referred to an FFRDC
model as a potential strategy to address the need for enhancing
CER.
Another proposed approach to managing CER is a Congres-
sionally chartered non-profit organization,47,50 such as the
National Academy of Sciences with its Institute of Medicine. A
Congressionally chartered “CER institute” could conduct
timely and responsive projects on behalf of a governing board
and could ensure consistency in developing and applying
standards to CER. Since such an institute would exist outside
the executive branch, however, it would have no authority to
coordinate with existing federal CER efforts or infrastructure,
nor (at least under current law) to contract with federal
agencies to conduct CER projects on its behalf. Accordingly,
the new institute likely would need to duplicate at least some,
and perhaps much, of the functions and infrastructure of
existing CER-related federal research agencies to achieve its
mission, hardly the most efficient strategy. While achieving a
high degree of political insulation, this approach also achieves
the greatest degree of autonomy. Congressionally chartered
corporations are not subject to federal advisory commission
rules or other federal regulations (unless these are explicitly
addressed in enabling legislation), so the institute could exert
considerable latitude in how it chose to define and implement
key IOM principles like accountability, objectivity, scientific
rigor, and transparency. Accordingly, the quality and clinical
implications of its CER reports would be highly dependent on
the governing board for the institute, the staff it employed, and
the research contractors it selected. Once such a CER institute
were established, it would not be easy to correct deficiencies;
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any change in the charter or in the funding would require a law
to be passed by both the House and the Senate and signed by
the President. This barrier to interference gives the institute
strong protection from the political process; given the US
history of past political interference in CER efforts and the
increasingly high stakes involved in the production of evi-
dence, this approach has its strong proponents. The “S. 3408:
Comparative Effectiveness Research Act of 2008” introduced
by Senators Baucus and Conrad has such a structure, estab-
lishing a Health Care Comparative Effectiveness Research
Institute with a 21-member Board of Governors.51
The most conventional approach to a public CER effort is that
proposed in the IOM report Knowing What Works in Health Care:
“Congress should direct the secretary of the US Department of
Health and Human Services to designate a single entity (the
Program) with authority, overarching responsibility, sustained
resources, and adequate capacity to ensure production of
credible, unbiased information about what is known and not
known about clinical effectiveness.” And “The secretary of Health
and Human Services should appoint a Clinical Effectiveness
Advisory Board to oversee the Program.”11 Legislatively, this
approach is similar to the House-passed version of comparative
effectiveness research, section 904 of the Children’s Health and
Medicare Protection Act.9 This approach may achieve a number
of the IOM’s proposed CER principles. Accountability is achieved
through a federal agency (e.g., AHRQ) managing the CER
portfolio with the oversight of an advisory board. HHS could
achieve efficiencies by using extant infrastructure at AHRQ52,53
(e.g., Evidence-based Practice Centers, Centers for Education
and Research on Therapeutics, etc.) and at the NIH (e.g.,
development and implementation of large clinical trials) to
answer priority research questions. Transparency would be
enhanced through the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),
while the management of the research process by federal
agencies contracting with university researchers ensures public
accountability. Nonetheless, because of the Constitution's
“separation of powers,” a non-political advisory board outside
the President’s control canmerely advise, not direct the actions of
a federal research agency; executive branch leadership retains
ultimate control over the agency’s responsiveness to recommen-
dations, timeliness of projects, adherence to standards of
evidence, and coordination and consistency of CER reports.
Congress canmanage this risk, however, through close oversight
and legislative intervention if advisory board recommendations
were ignored.
CONCLUSION
For public CER efforts to be successful, there must be
substantial and sustained federal investment. In an era of
skyrocketing federal deficits, severe economic recession, and
demands for increased public investments in traditional
biomedical research, achieving such financing will be a
challenge. Even if the CER financing and governance problems
are satisfactorily resolved, other controversial policy issues
remain, including the range of stake holder perspectives and
expertise to include in the governing board; the processes to
assure proper public input into CER projects and publications;
the development of findings and implications (i.e., recommen-
dations, guidelines, etc.); and the role for “value” (e.g., cost,
quality of life, and cost effectiveness) in evaluating and
reporting comparative clinical effectiveness. Of course, for
any new public investment in CER to realize a return to the
taxpayers, the new information must actually be put to use by
payers, providers, and patients to increase the use of highly
effective treatments and minimize the use of ineffective or
inefficient ones.4,9
In considering solutions to other health policy dilemmas,
leaders in the American College of Physicians (ACP) and
elsewhere have recently looked across our borders to find
useful models abroad.54 There are several vibrant and robust
examples of policy and practice-relevant CER in other
countries,11,55 but while these models are encouraging, they
likely provide insufficient guidance on US implementation. The
reasons involve not just differences in law and polity, but more
substantively, the much larger role health care plays across
many sectors of the US economy. Continued health care
expenditure growth and technology dissemination are built
into the business plans of many prominent corporations and
institutions. Therefore, the stakes for CER may be much
higher for more, and more prominent, advocates in the US
than in many other industrialized countries, and the chal-
lenges to manage the process thereby more complex.
Internal medicine, with its long history of commitment to
scientific medical practice and its leadership in evidence–based
medicine, has an enormous stake in the outcome of this debate.
We cannot countenance, nor can the nation afford, another
federal effort in CER to be paralyzed by a twenty-first century
version of AHCPR’s back pain malady, nor can we allow an
unaccountable and opaque “CER Institute” to use private
contractors to serve special interests; such an outcome could
also be harmful, risking misinformation to patients and clin-
icians while wasting money on redundant projects and bureau-
cracy. To solve our health-care problems, the US would be well
served by reestablishing the appropriate function of federal
health research agencies in public concerns. Given the broad
range of interests in CER, it is appropriate, even necessary, for an
independent, multi-stakeholder process (with a prominent role
for clinicians and consumers) to identify the clinical questions
that the American peoplemost need answering. A dedicated trust
fund immune from political influence should support this
essential work. And then the substantial infrastructure already
developed through past investments in AHRQ, NIH, VA, CDC,
etc., must be put to effective use. These resources will be critical
both in answering the clinical effectiveness questions confronted
by patients and their physicians, as well as solving the imple-
mentation science and knowledge translation problems familiar
to administrators and policymakers.
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